Abstract
The relations between Russia and Georgia after the collapse of the USSR went through a very difficult period of confrontation, the potential of which remains to this day. This
creates serious obstacles to the process of peaceful settlement of
problems in the Caucasus and ensuring stability in the region in the
long term. The article discusses the role and place of Georgia in the geopolitical alignment of forces in the Caucasus. The
possibilities and goals of regional and global centers of power that
influence the course of political processes are investigated. The prospects of Russian-Georgian relations in the coming decade are analyzed. Particular
attention is paid to the possibility, prerequisites and consequences of
the political and military confrontation between the two countries. The author's vision of solving existing problems and the peaceful development of the process is proposed.
Keywords.
Caucasus, Russia, geopolitics, stability, peace process, balance of forces, regional security.
The Caucasus as a key region.
The
geopolitical situation in the Caucasus is one of the most complicated
puzzles of world politics, which, despite the relatively small size of
the region,
in its complexity is not only inferior to the traditional hot regions
of the world, but sometimes surpasses them in the degree of involvement
of interests and explosiveness.
The Caucasus region is unique in its complexity and inconsistency. In the territory ,
which makes up less than a third of the territory of such European
countries as France and Germany, there will live several dozen major
nations and more than a hundred small nationalities. Statehood among them belongs to the Georgian, Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples. At the same time, in the Caucasus, the geopolitical interests of not only the adjacent states, but also several worlds intersect : the North (Russia), the South (Turkey), the West (Europe), the East (Iran). In a broader perspective, the Caucasus is the intersection of the interests of Christian and Islamic civilizations, and globally - the border between Europe and Asia and the shortest bridge between these regions[1] . Moreover, the Caucasus has access to two strategic marine basins at once:
- The Black Sea, which determines the interconnectedness and security of all of Eastern and Central Europe, with access to the Mediterranean and crossing the border of Eurasia and Africa;
- The Caspian Sea, affecting security and interaction throughout the Near and Middle East.
Geopolitical trends determined by modern superpowers
and a tremendous increase in the level of scientific and technological
progress that turned globalization into an interactive process involving
the entire population of the planet at the level of an individual
individual have a strong influence on the course of socio-political processes in the Caucasus. As a result, the region found itself in a completely new reality. For
centuries, the arena of confrontation between historical neighbors, the
Caucasus today is an object of interest and influence of all
significant centers of power .
Thus,
despite its small size, the Caucasus due to its geopolitical location
is one of the key regions of Eurasia, and by its contradictory nature it
is one of the most difficult to predict and unstable.
Based on the role and place that
the Caucasus occupies in the modern world, maintaining stability in the
region is of vital importance not only for regional, but also for
international security.
The 21st century will be characterized by a further increase in the speed and scale of transport and information flows; an increase in the military-economic potential of the leading powers of the modern world by rivalry between them; the emergence of new natural and man-made challenges at the global level. All these processes will be displayed in the Caucasus, causing, in turn, a backlash. Taking
into account the interests, capabilities and determination of global
players, processes in the Caucasus can become the starting point of a
geopolitical confrontation until it develops into a hot phase.
Thus,
it is vitally important to identify the current and potential
geopolitical risks in the Caucasus and ways to solve them in order to
prevent potential regional and then international escalation.
It is in the light of such a unique geopolitical position
of the Caucasus that we should consider the development of relations
between Russia and Georgia in 2020-2030 and, first of all, determine the likelihood of renewal and the main directions of the military conflict between them.
In studying this issue, one should proceed from the following fundamental principles:
❖ Russia's
foreign policy in the Caucasus is not a separate phenomenon, but is an
integral part of its global foreign policy strategy. Any, even the most insignificant steps of Russia in the Caucasus are determined by its global interests projected onto the Caucasus region and undertaken as an integral part of its policy to restore its status as a superpower and a world center of power.
❖ Russia's Caucasian policy is closely linked to its policy in the Black Sea and Caspian basins.
❖ The Caucasian
direction is considered by Russia as a key element of the Mediterranean
direction, because it is in the Caucasus that Russia borders on such
leading centers of the Islamic world as Turkey and Iran.
❖ The Caucasian
policy of Russia proceeds from the prevention of the spread of the
geopolitical influence of the Western world in the region and completely
excludes the organizational inclusion in NATO of any of its
international actors (Georgia, Armenia or Azerbaijan). This priority of the Russian strategy is enduring, regardless of its social formation and state system. To realize this priority, Russia is ready to take the most radical steps, up to armed confrontation not only at the regional, but also at the international level.
❖ With
all this, Russia will avoid the aggravation of the situation in the
Caucasus as much as possible and until the last moment adhere to the
policy of “soft power” using hybrid means and forms of influence. The transition to direct military intervention will occur only after the exhaustion of these resources.
Geopolitics of the Black Sea and Caspian regions
The
uniqueness of the geopolitical position of the Caucasus is determined
not only by its location at the intersection of key Eurasian centers of
power and directions
of civilizational influence, but also by the peculiarity of the
adjacent sea and land communications, which open up access to the region
from the most distant directions.
A decisive role in this is played by marine communications connecting the Caucasus through the Black and Caspian Seas with the whole world.[2] .
The
factor of geopolitical diversity is greatly enhanced by the
geographical presence in the basins of these seas of the most diverse
states in terms of their national-cultural structure and foreign policy
orientation.
Thus, Caucasus is not only a border zone of several civilizations, but also a buffer
zone between them, due to objective historical factors. The geopolitics of the Black Sea and Caspian basins is a direct reflection of this reality.
The Black Sea region is a zone of intersection of interests of several centers of power at once: Russia, Turkey and Europe. More broadly, the Black Sea is of interest to China and India (transport and economic factor). At the same time, geopolitical forces historically present in the basin are in permanent rivalry for spheres of influence on a European, Eurasian, and global scale. This rivalry regularly develops into a military confrontation between them at the regional and global levels.
The Caspian Sea is a zone of intersection of interests of several civilization centers at once: Russian, Persian, Turkic, Chinese, Indian. In confessional terms, the Caspian region is even more complex than the Black Sea region, in which there are only Christian and Islamic factors. The
Caspian region is complemented by two main branches of Islam: Sunni and
Shiite, as well as Confucian and Buddhist confessional factors. An
extremely important influence on the balance of power in the Caspian
region is provided by the extraction and transportation of hydrocarbons [3]
The
geostrategic interconnectedness of these two regions is an enduring
permanent historical factor, the significance and vector of influence of
which can vary depending on the conditions of a particular historical
era, but which always retains its influence.
Thus, the geopolitics of the Black Sea and Caspian regions are determined by the following circumstances:
Location at the intersection of civilizations
Channel for projecting the interests of world power centers on the main regions of Eurasia
Extraction and transportation of energy resources
Proceeding from this, the status of the Caucasus as a historically determined buffer zone between civilizations and
the permanent irreconcilable rivalry of global centers of power for
influence both on the region itself and for the advantages received by
the dominant force outside it becomes obvious .
The place and role of Georgia
in the Caucasian geopolitical alignment is determined by its access to
the Black Sea, the presence of a common border with Russia and Turkey,
and proximity to the Caspian Sea. At the same time, Georgia, as a NATO partner, is of interest to him as the shortest route from Europe to Asia, opening up the shortest access to the fossil mineral resources of Central Asia. Thanks
to Georgia, NATO can secure a solid footing in the Black Sea, and the
United States can project strength into the Middle East. At the same time, Turkey does not always follow in
the wake of American foreign policy, which further increases the
importance of Georgia in the system of strategic interests of the USA[4] . This is confirmed by the new three-year framework agreement in the field of defense and security between the United States and Georgia, signed in Washington on November 21, 2019.[5]
Georgia today: opportunities and reality
Modern Georgia is significantly different from what it was in the 90s of the twentieth century. At
present, the collapse of the Georgian economy that has come about after
the collapse of the USSR due to the destruction of common economic ties
and the complete incompetence of the Shevardnadze regime in public
administration has been overcome to a certain extent.
The main segments of the structure of the modern Georgian economy are:
- Energy,
- Agriculture
- Tourism
- Logistics (transport communications)
- Financial sector
Georgia's gross national product is growing every year and in 2018 amounted to $ 42.6 billion[6] . However,
this indicator is not sufficient to ensure the interests of Georgia in
the international arena through economic influence.
In Georgia, the West European political model of the presidential republic has been formed, which, despite periodic upheavals, functions within the framework of democratic norms and principles.
The Georgian armed forces are in the process of systematic qualitative and quantitative growth. They are greatly supported in participating in international military exercises conducted both in Georgia and abroad. A similar role is played by participation in international peacekeeping missions. Significant structural reforms have been carried out in the Georgian Armed Forces over the past decade, as a result of which they have been transferred to NATO organizational standards. However, the Georgian army remains the smallest in the Caucasus compared with the armies of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The biggest problem is the role and place of Georgia in the geopolitical alignment of forces in the Caucasus region. The position of Georgia in this regard is extremely contradictory. Situated
in a relatively small geographical area, limited by mountain ranges
from the north and south, from the west by the Black Sea, and from the
east by the Caspian, Georgia is an extremely important geopolitical
bridgehead for expanding influence in all directions. Therefore, the confrontation for influence on it is not limited to the interests of regional powers and is in the nature of a permanent struggle at the global level .
West-oriented Georgia faces many obstacles. Some of these factors are critical, which Georgia is not able to overcome with the geopolitical resources at its disposal. Moreover, even from its Western
partners, considerable efforts and time are required to achieve the
desired results in supporting the European orientation of Georgia.
These factors include:
Participation in global projects, primarily membership in the European Community and the course towards NATO membership [7] . An
objective reality is the fact that for Russia, the membership of
Georgia and Ukraine in NATO is the red line, after which all diplomatic
and political conventions end and the full-scale use of military
potential begins.
Georgia’s participation in global stability projects: in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa. This activity is seen by Russia as a military-political support for the camp of its geopolitical rivals.
participation
in NATO military activity, as a result of which Georgia, even without
formal membership in this alliance, is involved in its main activities:
military exercises, peacekeeping operations, logistic communications,
information field, structural reform of the Armed Forces. In
the Russian political elite, such activity is perceived as a direct
participation in the implementation of NATO plans and the creation of an
immediate threat to Russia [8] . In this regard, for the leadership of Russia, questions of the formal membership of Georgia in NATO no longer play a significant role. It proceeds from the existing fact of Georgia’s participation in NATO activities.
Former
autonomies represented by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are de
facto uncontrolled regions, which directly contradicts one of the main
conditions for NATO membership - the territorial integrity of the
candidate state. At
the same time, Russian military bases are located on the territories of
both autonomies, which, if Georgia joins the North Atlantic Alliance,
directly implies the exceptional proximity of the opposing forces and
creates a high probability of a direct military conflict even in
peacetime. At
the same time, Russia has a whole range of economic, political,
diplomatic and informational opportunities that enable it to manage
processes in the Caucasus in its own interests. The August war of 2008 showed that Russia is ready to go to a direct military confrontation to realize its interests.
Centers of potential destabilization in the southern regions of Georgia - Adjara and Lower Kartli. Adjara has a high percentage of Georgian population with Islamic faith. With the involvement of appropriate political technologies, this factor can turn into a serious destabilizing force. The compact majority of the population in Lower Kartli are ethnic Azerbaijanis and Armenians, which, if appropriate forces and means are involved , makes them sleeping centers of destabilization [9] . At
the same time, even the economic upsurge of these regions cannot
guarantee stability if aggravation of interethnic or confessional
contradictions occurs.[10] . It should be borne in mind that the region is directly adjacent to the borders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, which leads to:
- at a high rate of development of possible destructive processes;
- m maximum material and informational support of the destructive forces intensified in these regions;
- The immediate danger of the conflict being transferred to the territory of neighboring countries with the prospect of further escalation at the interstate level and its development into a full-scale war.
Economic dependence on the Russian market. The most vulnerable sectors are winemaking and the tourism industry.
Energy dependence on Russia, especially in the field of electric power , petroleum and natural gas;
In Part B of global information, transport and energy projects [11] . In this regard, the most vulnerable:
- sea communications of the Black Sea basin, which are in direct reach of Russian strike weapons, including the Bosporus and Dardanelles;
- railway and automobile highways that connect the Black Sea with the Caspian Sea;
- the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which plays a significant role in the global turnover of hydrocarbon energy raw materials;
The threat and Islamic slam extremism, which can develop in Georgia in two main directions:
- in the outbreak of global extremist forces operating in the Middle East. The greatest danger in this regard is ISIS;
- The processes of radicalization taking place in the North Caucasus, directly adjacent to the border of Georgia. It should be noted that the Russian authorities have been fighting extremism in this region for more than a quarter of a century, but the situation is still far from complete stability.[12]
Based
on the geopolitical situation and military capabilities of Georgia, the
most acceptable strategy for maintaining its sovereignty is a strategy
of total defense, in which all its resources will be involved. However, in the event of large-scale aggression of Georgia, the assistance of its Western partners will be required. This applies primarily to its strategic partners in NATO. It
is necessary to take into account that Russia’s involvement in the
conflict with Georgia will not only not stop, but also stimulate even
more active actions, up to a global escalation with irreparable
consequences.
Thus,
the European community and NATO should have a clear view of the
Georgian dilemma - are they ready for a full-scale war with Russia over
Georgia. Any option for the development of the situation in this scenario is fraught with catastrophic consequences. The
historical experience of the war with Russia unequivocally indicates
that even with the most incredible losses, Russia retains viability and
the will to resist, which makes further struggle against it futile.
Consequently, there is no alternative to peaceful process management. Realism and a balanced approach are the only ones acceptable in the coming decade to prevent a confrontation with Russia. Strategy in relations with Russia is necessary to be extremely realistic, simple and flexible, which will:
● proceed from the fact of the permanent influence of Russia in the Caucasus as a global force
● will be focused on quick and deep changes in the situation;
● will have ample space for political maneuver;
● will provide continuous political dialogue ;
● widely uses all available political, economic, scientific and cultural resources in relations with Russia.
Russia as a global power
Russia as a Eurasian power began to form in the 16th century through the efforts of Ivan the Terrible. The movement to the north, west, east and south has become the systemic priority of Russian foreign policy. This process
is indefinite and remains the imperishable imperative of Russian
geopolitics, regardless of its social structure and historical era.
Having established itself as a Eurasian force in the 16th century, Russia became a full-fledged participant in the world historical process, often exerting a decisive influence on it. The
influence of Russia on history has become especially powerful since the
18th century, with access to the Baltic Sea and the formation of a
clear and firm vector of its European policy.
Over the past century, Russia
has experienced many ups and downs, but has steadily emerged from all
internal and external shocks even more geopolitically strengthened.
This led to the statement of Russia:
- to the north - along the entire coast of the North Ice of the total ocean;
-
in the western direction - in the Western Russian lands, in the Baltic
States and Finland with access to the Baltic Sea and international sea
communications;
- in the eastern direction - in the Urals, in Siberia, in the Far East with access to the Pacific Ocean;
- in the southeast direction - in Central Asia with access to India and China;
- to the south - in the Caucasus, on the Black and Caspian Seas with access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East
The
20th century turned out to be the most difficult in Russian history,
when in a relatively short period by historical standards - for seven
decades, Russia went through two great geopolitical shocks at once: the
collapse of the Russian monarchy in 1917 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The
scale of these destructive processes was determined both by the size of
Russia itself and by the nature of the destructive social and political
forces brought to life. The gigantic human, territorial and material losses suffered by Russia
during these cataclysms could not undermine the biological strength of
the Russian people and their state and political potential.
In this case, special attention should be paid to the processes taking place in Russia in the modern period. As a result of the collapse of the
USSR, Russia was thrown back into the past at the level of Muscovite
Russia in the first half of the 17th century, and the outbreak of war in
Chechnya directly led to its further disintegration. However, instead of continuing centrifugal processes, Russia again began to consolidate and restore its geopolitical power.
At
the moment, Russia has already returned to the international arena as a
full-fledged player and is participating in all global political,
economic, transport and information processes.
Russia is systematically restoring its position in traditional spheres of influence. The absolute priority is the post-Soviet space, which Russia sees as the sphere of its vital interests. An analysis of Russia's foreign policy in the "near abroad" clearly
indicates that to achieve its goal, it is ready to use the widest range
of means from "soft power" to military influence. At the same time, military means are considered by the Russian leadership as the last argument, when all the peaceful means of achieving the goal have been exhausted. This
is precisely the essence of modern Russian hybrid strategy: maximum
flexibility and a variety of means and forms of influence on processes
in order to create favorable internal and external conditions to achieve
the goal.
It
should be borne in mind that Russia’s reversal from the fall to the
restoration of geopolitical power occurred in extremely unfavorable
conditions for it as an internal systemic crisis and a loss of foreign
policy positions. This clearly indicates the
preservation by Russia of a powerful potential for vitality and
resistance to the most radical shocks, up to a change in the social
formation.
Of particular note is the widespread modernization of the armed forces, which aims to ensure the Russian army and dominance in space, atmosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere and cyber sphere. This strategic line is being drawn by Russia in the following areas:
-
structural updating of the Armed forces, including military districts,
the number, composition and deployment of formations and units,
command and control processes, the number of personnel and the share of
professional sergeant personnel, the quantity and quality of new
weapons and military equipment;
- modernization and development of traditional means of aerospace, ground, surface and underwater destruction, combat and logistic support;
-
development and implementation of the latest and promising weapons of
destruction, including those that are based on new physical principles;
- modularity, versatility and interchangeability of combat systems,
allowing them to be placed on aerospace, ground, surface and underwater
vehicles, reduce the cost of their production and release them in bulk
- regular military exercises, including those of a strategic nature, as close as possible to combat conditions and oriented towards armed confrontation in several strategic directions at once;
-
the wide involvement of their strategic partners in the CSTO and SCO in
military cooperation: military maneuvers, development and supply of the
latest combat systems;
- direct participation in local conflicts in order to maintain their geopolitical positions and gain modern combat experience;
In
this regard, we consider it necessary to conduct a brief review of
modern combat systems that have already passed state tests, and some
have been tested in combat conditions. These systems are already supplied to the Russian army and navy:
❖ Caliber cruise missiles deployed on air, ground, surface and underwater carriers, with a range of up to 2500 - 3500 km [13]
❖ Hypersonic rockets "Zircon", "Dagger" and "Vanguard" [14] capable of striking the entire operational-tactical and strategic depth of the enemy
❖ A lot of fifth-generation target fighter Su-57 [15] operating as part of a combat network along with aerospace, ground, surface and underwater drones;
❖ Shock laser complex "Peresvet" [17] , designed to perform the functions of air defense and missile defense both in the atmosphere and in outer space
❖ Systems for the early detection of aerospace targets, including the over-the-horizon Container radar capable of detecting stealth aircraft over 3,000 kilometers [19] . The
radar is capable of detecting and classifying targets according to the
type of aircraft: fighters, bombers, cruise, ballistic and hypersonic
missiles.
❖ Intercontinental ballistic missiles "Sarmat" [21] with a range of 18,000 km and more than 10 warheads and Yars[22] with a range of 12,000 km and 6 warheads
These weapon systems are revolutionary in nature due to their speed, range, accuracy and striking power. At the same time, Russia is developing new, even more powerful combat systems that will ensure its effective dominance in future wars.
All
this determines the scale of Russian military influence at the regional
and global levels and requires the most careful data analysis and
caution in building relations with Russia. A true fact is the restoration
of Russia's military power and its readiness for a full-scale war for
its national interests with any strategic adversary.
The most important condition for developing a policy towards Russia is the recognition of the fact that Russia is not just a force to be reckoned with, but also an unpredictable one. Winston Churchill admitted this fact at one time[24] . We must admit that nothing has changed since then.
Turkey as a regional power
For Georgia, relations with Turkey are very important , in coordination with which Russia will pursue its entire southern policy. This was clearly confirmed by the example of Syria. The historical rivalry of the two countries in the Caucasus and the Black Sea is currently giving way to partnership based on a lot of coordination of geopolitical priorities. Turkey’s
independent independent foreign policy at the present stage is uniquely
oriented towards the further consolidation of its position as one of
the leading powers of the Islamic world and a decisive factor at the
intersection of the geopolitical interests of Europe and Asia.
The
millennial presence of Turkey in the geopolitical space of the East has
had and is having a permanent impact on the history of Georgia. The Caucasus has always been considered as one of the key areas of Turkish foreign policy,
since dominance in the Caucasus ensured dominance in the Black Sea and
protected the north of Turkey from the influence of other geopolitical
forces in the region: Russia and Iran.
At the same time, dominance in the Caucasus ensured the position of Turkey in the entire southern Black Sea region and gave wide scope for movement to Europe.
Based
on the historically determined buffer role of the Caucasus,
confrontation over its possession has always been the essence of
regional politics. The rivalry between Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus from the second half
of the 16th century turned into a military confrontation and continued
for all subsequent centuries, up to and including the First World War. The
high probability of Turkey becoming involved in the war against the
USSR remained in the Second World War, a feature depending on the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad. During the Cold War, it was precisely the confrontation with the USSR that largely determined Turkey’s membership in NATO.
However,
after the collapse of the USSR, there was a tendency toward
rapprochement between the two countries on a number of issues of mutual interest. It
should be noted that this movement towards building a new format of
relations was bilateral in the 90s of the twentieth century[25] .
The process of mutual rapprochement was further facilitated by the traditionally independent character of Turkish politics, despite the orientation towards Western values both in foreign policy issues and in the socio-legal model[26] .
The Russian leadership skillfully used this desire of the Turkish side to form a solid basis for long-term stable relations with Turkey with the prospect of their development into a strategic partnership. At the same time, both sides were mutually interested
in resolving even the most serious disagreements, including the
incident with the downed Russian military aircraft in northern Syria in
2015[27] .
And the result
of this was close cooperation in a wide range of issues, including
economics, energy, foreign policy, scientific, technical, information
and military spheres. Trade turnover between Russia and Turkey is steadily increasing and in 2018 exceeded $ 25 billion[28] . At the same time, both countries openly declare their desire to increase annual trade turnover to $ 100 billion.[29] .
The most serious consequences for regional security are cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the military sphere. Turkey’s
supply of the latest Russian S-400 air defense systems is a clear
evidence of the emerging close partnership between the two countries in
the military-technical sphere, which will inevitably affect the
geopolitical balance in the region. The capabilities of the
S-400 complex, as well as the issues of supplying other advanced combat
systems, in particular the fifth-generation Su-57 fighter, are
considered direct steps to transfer military cooperation between Russia
and Turkey to the level of strategic partnership.
The
result of such a close rapprochement between the two countries will
inevitably be their decisive influence in the Black Sea region and the
Caucasus. Given the
independent nature of Turkey’s membership in NATO and the readiness of
its leadership to pursue an independent course within the framework of
the overall strategy of this bloc, it should be expected that it will adhere to this line in the Caucasus as well. In this regard, Turkey will always give preference to its national interests instead of bloc interests.
Thus, Georgia, focused on the EU and NATO , is between a rock and a hard place. At the same time, pressure on it is of an ever increasing nature from both the Russian side and the Turkish side. This applies to all spheres of state and social life: economics, finance, energy, real estate, transport infrastructure and information space.
Probability and possible scenarios of the Russian-Georgian conflict
Background to the Russian-Georgian conflict.
Relations between Russia and Georgia at the present stage were largely formed at the turn of the 80-90s of the 20th century, when the process of destruction of the USSR began and centrifugal tendencies in the Union republics were clearly identified. Demonstrations against the Soviet social system and the communist party- political
system of state power took place almost everywhere, but in Georgia they
took on a completely open and extremely sharp character in the form of
massive demonstrations of disobedience to union power institutions. Of particular note is the unity shown at
that time of all social strata of Georgian society in a negative
attitude to the existing state system and the desire to secede from the
USSR. The central government, unable to cope with its own initiated processes of “publicity ” and “democracy”, reacted to such actions extremely painfully and ineptly. There was no dialogue between Moscow and the national republics, it all came down to empty talk and prohibitive measures. This state of affairs was explained by the political unprofessionalism
of the top leadership of the USSR, which turned out to be incapable of
modernizing the existing public-state system in accordance with the
requirements of the time and transferring the country to a dynamic path
of development while maintaining the foundations of the existing system. The
lack of political will and basic knowledge in the field of politics and
the social sciences predetermined the complete disintegration of Soviet
society in the early 90s.
Georgia in the conditions of growing chaos with its open demands for independence caused particular
irritation of the Gorbachev regime, which resulted in an open
suppression of the antigovernmental demonstration in Tbilisi on April 9,
1989 with massive casualties and curfews.
In the future, the confrontation between the Gorbachev government and the Georgian society
only grew, spreading to two regions within Georgia, which had a
separate legal status of autonomy in its composition - Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. There is no doubt that the conflict between the population of these regions with the Georgian population is
artificial and was purposefully unleashed by the Gorbachev regime to
destabilize the situation in the republic on the eve of the destruction
of the USSR. There were no
internal contradictions for the growth of tension and, especially, for
the outbreak of hostilities in these autonomies .
The
situation was aggravated by the internal political crisis in the form
of confrontation between various parties and movements, which were
unable to reach a compromise on the redistribution of power and the
post-Soviet development path of Georgia. At the same time, the sensible part
of the Georgian scientific and cultural intelligentsia, which called
for cautious steps in the context of increasing disintegration and the
development of a balanced program for the construction of a new state,
was pushed out of the stage for political life. The processes began to be determined
by parties and movements, the composition and leadership of which had
neither political experience, nor fundamental legal and political
knowledge, nor civic responsibility. This led to a complete disorientation of Georgian society and a sharp undermining of internal stability.
As
a result, at the time of the destruction of the USSR in August 1991,
Georgia approached in a state close to a social explosion. What happened in the form of a coup in December 1991 - January 1992. Given the complete collapse of decades of social
and economic ties, this coup was the final chord of the collapse of the
social structure of Georgia, which plunged it into complete chaos.
The
situation in Georgia in the early 90s was directly determined by the
characteristic features of the transition period when the social
formation changed. In fact, the system of social reproduction and unified self-government was destroyed. Many of the necessary attributes of the state system were either formal in nature (central and regional authorities, the legal system), or were absent altogether. The
result of this was rampant crime, the destruction of the foundations of
the economy and social security, the collapse of the national currency and a catastrophic decline in the standard of living of the population. This
was complemented by the uncertain legal status of the new regime led by
Shevardnadze, who seized power through a coup and expelled the first
legally elected president of Georgia, Gamsakhurdia.
In
such circumstances, the primary task of the new government was to solve
urgent socio-economic problems and build a new independent state using
the experience and support of Western partners. It was necessary to
maintain maximum caution in relations with Russia, in which the
political elite had already developed an extremely negative perception
of the processes in Georgia and a willingness to react to them in the
most severe way. At the same time, its support for the Abkhaz and Ossetian autonomies was completely open, including the military component.
However,
the Shevardnadze government did not follow the path of dialogue with
the autonomies, did not use all the political resources at its disposal
to maintain stability within Georgia. This
led to the start of hostilities in Abkhazia in August 1992, which
immediately took the form of a confrontation between the armed units of
the National Guard of Georgia and military mercenaries from the North
Caucasus and the territory of the entire former USSR. These
resources were immediately taken under control by the Yeltsin regime
that came to power and managed until the end of the war in September
1992. The result of this local conflict was the death of tens of thousands of civilians, the expulsion from Abkhazia of more
than three hundred thousand ethnic Georgians and the actual withdrawal
of the region from the jurisdiction of the Georgian state.
Similar processes took place in South Ossetia, albeit on a smaller scale. The
most important feature of the conflict in South Ossetia was the
preservation on the territory of autonomy of approximately 50 thousandth
Georgian population until the August 2008 war.
Thus ,
after the collapse of the USSR, Georgia suffered the largest
demographic, socio-economic and territorial losses among all the former
Soviet republics, which determined the extremely difficult way of
forming a new statehood in the subsequent period. These losses will affect the history of Georgia throughout the 21st century. The
most difficult circumstance was not just the lack of balanced relations
with Russia, but actually an indirect military confrontation with it
during the war in Abkhazia in 1992-1993 . Given
Russia's influence in the Caucasus as a whole, the prospects for a
settlement in autonomous de facto autonomies directly depended on its
position. Against the
background of the negative attitude of the Russian political elite and
the results of the hostilities of 1992-1993, the position of Russia in relation to it was appropriate, which led to the freezing of the Abkhaz and Ossetian conflicts for an indefinite period.
At
the same time, the Georgian political elite lacked awareness of the
scale of the national catastrophe and the loss of the former autonomies
was seen as a temporary and reversible factor. To
a large extent, this led to insufficient attention and efficiency of
the then leadership of Georgia to solve the problem, including and with the engagement of the international community. A whole decade was lost, during which a new generation grew up, perceiving the existing status quo as this reality initially.
The change of political power in Georgia in November 2003 led to significant changes in the country's domestic and foreign policy, but in relations with Russia it only aggravated the situation. The new government immediately proclaimed a pro-Western course and took the path of further confrontation with Russia. There was still no understanding that the pro-Western course does not exclude balanced relations with the northern neighbor. To
this was added the personal authoritarian features of the new
leadership of Georgia, which led to the formation of an even tougher
regime of personal power and virtually eliminated the development of
alternative plans for domestic and foreign policy, as well as free discussion of ways for the further development of the country.
The
course towards the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia
was proclaimed one of the strategic priorities of the new government. However, this course was carried out not taking into account the position of Russia, but directly contrary to it. There was a clear underestimation of Russia's military resources and the mood of its military-political elite.
All
this happened against the backdrop of the ever growing military and
economic potential of Russia and the beginning of an active foreign
policy to return to traditional spheres of influence both on the territory of the former USSR and on a global scale. The
presence of such a powerful neighbor, with whom relations in the
post-Soviet era were extremely tense, clearly demanded maximum caution from the Georgian leadership both in political rhetoric and in practical steps. The
support of Western partners should have been used taking into account
their interests, and not for reckless steps that could lead to a
large-scale military-political crisis.
Such an unreasonable
foreign policy directly pushed the situation towards an even greater
confrontation, which, in turn, would certainly be used by Russia to
further advance its strategic interests in the Caucasus. This is exactly what happened in August 2008 ,
when the outbreak of military conflict in South Ossetia from the very
beginning went beyond confrontation with the autonomy authorities and
grew into military operations with the Russian army.
The results of the August war further aggravated the geopolitical catastrophe of Georgia at the beginning of the 1990s. After
the cessation of hostilities, Russia officially recognized the
independence of the breakaway autonomies from Georgia as independent
states and began to build relations with them already completely
ignoring the position of Georgia. In a short period of time,
powerful military bases were created in both autonomies, thanks to
which Russia can manage processes not only in the Caucasus, but also
extend its influence to the Middle East and the Mediterranean. As a result of the violation of territorial integrity, the process of Georgia’s membership in NATO was significantly inhibited. The
new military-political defeat had an extremely negative impact on
public sentiment in Georgia, which negatively affected its internal
stability.
The sluggish conflict in the former autonomy on
the territory of Georgia took on the character of a constant
existential threat, capable of erupting at any moment in a new, even
larger-scale war with even more serious consequences. This constant balancing on the brink of a new war is an integral part of the geopolitical reality in the Caucasus after August 2008. The
danger of this situation is further aggravated by the unpredictability
of the causes of a new conflict, which may arise generally outside the
Caucasus, and Russia interpreted as an occasion for the resumption of hostilities.
Possible conflict scenarios
At
present, Russia is not interested in the growth of military-political
tension in the Caucasus and will in every possible way avoid military
escalation in force,
- the priority of the long-term strategy of “ soft power” to restore its influence in the post-Soviet space;
- the desire to avoid instability on its southern borders;
At
the same time, Russia's geopolitical positions in the Caucasus, in the
Black Sea and Caspian regions have been sufficiently strengthened as a result:
- gaining a strong position in the region after the five-day war in August 2008.
- strong partnerships with Turkey;
- Allied relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan;
- the return of the Crimea;
- recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
All
this makes it unnecessary for the Russian leadership to pursue an open
force policy both in relation to Georgia and the Caucasus as a whole.
Nevertheless, in the coming decade, the likelihood of a new military conflict between Russia and Georgia should be considered quite high. It
should be assumed that Russia considers the Caucasus not only as a zone
of its enduring vital interests, but also as one of the most vulnerable
areas. This assessment of the role and place of the region in the geostrategic alignment of forces is further
strengthened against the background of the course and results of the
civil war in Chechnya, which not only questioned Russia's position in
the Caucasus, but also directly threatened a chain reaction of its
collapse. In order to maintain and strengthen its position in the Caucasus, Russia is ready to take the most decisive measures, right up to a direct military confrontation with NATO. This
is due to the perception of the Caucasus in the minds of the Russian
political elite as the last frontier of defense, and in fact - as a
front-line region. Based on the military doctrine of Russia, which
provides for the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the uncompromising
attitude of the Russian mentality, which is ready to take the most
extreme measures in a war, it is necessary to clearly understand that
any military clash between Russia and NATO in the Caucasus, as in a
buffer zone, can become a starting point for a full-fledged global nuclear conflict.
The
high probability of the resumption of the military conflict between
Georgia and Russia is determined by a whole complex of objective and
subjective factors that will remain in force in the foreseeable future.
Objective factors:
- Permanent geopolitical confrontation in the Caucasus of global players;
- Western foreign policy orientation of Georgia with the specifically expressed goal of NATO membership[30] ;
- lack of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia;
- The frozen and uncertain international status of the former autonomies: Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
- The incompleteness of the peaceful settlement of the August war of 2008 in the framework of international law.
Subjective factors:
-
the readiness of the Russian political elite to take the most decisive
steps in safeguarding their interests in the Caucasus, including
military action;
- Domestic political instability of Georgia;
- Clash of global players in other regions of the world with resonance projection in the Caucasus
Thus, in the Caucasus as a whole and in Georgia in particular, there is an extremely unstable prospect for the development of the military-political situation, due to the strong influence of both risk factors and constraining factors. The continued persistence of such uncertainty is fraught with a serious potential for destabilization.
Based on the current stalemate, forecasting possible scenarios of a new escalation of tension is an extremely difficult task. However,
the identification of even general directions of the possible
development of the process is necessary for the development of the main
set of measures to prevent negative trends. At
the same time, a multilateral understanding of possible changes makes
it possible to be prepared for various options for the development of
the situation and the implementation of preventive de-escalation
measures.
The first scenario (as the most likely) is the aggravation of the situation on the borders of the former autonomies with further armed escalation. Given
Russia's military presence in both autonomies, it will be practically
impossible to avoid the involvement of Russian troops in a military
conflict already at the initial stage of the crisis, which will
immediately develop into a new full-scale war. The
difference from the August 2008 war will be that for Russia there will
be no restraining motives and the hostilities will spread throughout
Georgia. The intervention of the international community will not be a decisive factor
in the cessation of hostilities, and any attempt of NATO military
assistance to Georgia (logistics, intelligence, military advisers) will
be immediately regarded by Russia as the beginning of a military
conflict with the West. When modeling the escalation ,
one should proceed from the real prospect of a military clash between
Russia and NATO, which will go beyond the Caucasus and spread, at least,
to Europe, the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. In itself, this will already mean a global confrontation that will draw the rest of the world into itself.
The second scenario is an aggravation of relations between Georgia and Russia. This scenario has very serious prerequisites for a rapid and irreversible escalation due to three critical factors:
- lack of diplomatic relations
between Georgia and Russia, which significantly slows down and reduces
the level of interaction in emergency situations. The time factor is critical, but under the circumstances, this resource will be impossible to realize;
- the total divergence of foreign
policy interests and priorities, initially excluding any compromise
between the parties in both peaceful and military form;
- unresolved in the framework of international law, the military conflict of August 2008.
Each
of these factors, even taken separately, is critical and can lead to
extremely dangerous developments both on a regional and international
scale. However, one should proceed from the high probability of the simultaneous activation of all three factors due to a combination of objective and subjective processes in world politics.
The third scenario is an aggravation of relations between Georgia and its regional neighbors - Armenia and Azerbaijan. Confrontation may develop on a territorial issue and
/ or on the basis of an interethnic conflict in the internal enclaves
of Georgia populated by ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Given
the presence of Russian troops in Armenia, as well as the small size of
the Caucasus region as a whole, the likelihood of their involvement in military escalation is high. As
a result, the conflict may already take on a multilateral character at
the initial stage, and NATO’s attempts to provide assistance to Georgia
will lead to the consequences already considered in the first scenario.
The fourth scenario is in the nutritious
political crisis in Georgia, with the destabilization of the general
situation in the country and the spread of tension throughout the
region. The internal chaos in Georgia, modeled on the 90s. inevitably lead to the spread of violence in the country, the violation of the stability of its state borders and the spread of tension in the former autonomy. The
absence of firm state control over the processes in society and the
destruction of the law enforcement system will open the way to the
appearance of all kinds of paramilitary and paramilitary formations controlled by criminal and marginal elements. The motivation of such formations is always limited to issues of personal enrichment and local influence. Moreover, the clash of interests between them always assumes the character of an exclusively Auger confrontation and readiness to commit any crimes. In
such conditions, the statehood of Georgia, as a legal and political
institution, will be extremely weakened, and its foreign policy steps,
with regard to Russia (including provocative ones ) will be in the hands of random and irresponsible people.
The fifth scenario is
a clash of the global interests of Russia and NATO in the international
arena with the projection of confrontation in the Caucasus region. Given Russia's strengthened position in Syria,
which gives it the opportunity to gain a foothold in the Middle East,
any undesirable development of events in this region will cause an
immediate reaction in the Caucasus, as the last line of defense that
runs directly along its southern border
It should be borne in mind that in
the event of a resumption of the conflict, it will be characterized by a
whole range of factors arising from the destructive power of modern
weapons, a small theater of operations, a high population density and
geopolitical significance of Georgia in the regional balance of forces. Due to this, a new conflict will be characterized by:
- transience;
- massing forces and means in the main areas;
- the exceptional fierce confrontation and heavy losses among the civilian population;
- full military- political dominance and change of political regime.
It
can be unequivocally stated that in the event of a new military
conflict with Russia, Georgia will suffer such strategic losses in the
population, economy and state-legal sphere that would call into question its statehood and sovereignty.
Conclusion
The reformatting of the Eurasian geopolitical space , which began at the turn of the 80-90s of the XX century, continues to this day. It
can be unequivocally stated that the tectonic geopolitical shifts that
began in this period will affect the course of the historical process
throughout the coming millennium.
The
scope, depth and speed of international processes is even more growing
in the face of exceptional achievements in scientific and technological
progress, which results in a fundamental change in the content,
structure and directions of transport and information flows. The
consequence of this is the unprecedented rapprochement of nations and
states on a global scale in human history, the interpenetration of
cultures and habitats. Global demographic processes lead to the redrawing of the demographic map of the planet and the formation of new communities in the previously traditionally inaccessible spheres of their habitat.
Under
these conditions, it is difficult for even the major powers to maintain
internal stability and identity, which will push them to the most
radical steps in the implementation of their national interests.
This is most clearly expressed in the foreign policy of Russia, which is clearly aimed at restoring its geopolitical power. Under these conditions, the issue of relations with Russia is of fundamental importance for Georgia and is an important condition for its future development.
The
inconsistency of the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus, the
multi-vector nature of the current balance of forces and the general
tension that developed in the region in the post-Soviet period on the
basis of interethnic military conflicts make it possible to resume them in several directions at once. At the same time, a military clash with Russia in the early 90s of the XX century and in August 2008 is a fact for Georgia. Both conflicts led to extremely grave consequences for Georgia, and the potential for a new escalation still persists. Such
a development of events, if the western partners of Georgia intervene,
will be fraught with general destabilization not only on a regional, but
also on a global scale.
Thereby, despite the highest possibility of a new military conflict in the coming decade, the peace process there is no alternative. Only through the peace process can military confrontation and global destabilization be avoided.
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